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The Circumvention of UEFA’s 
Financial Fair Play Rules Through the 
Influx of Foreign Investments 
Patrick J. Sims* 
Abstract: European football is undergoing rapid changes spurred on by 
enormous investments from around the globe. Although regulations exist to 
curtail teams buying their way to success, foreign investors have become 
ingenious at circumventing Financial Fair Play rules. The European 
football governing body needs to reevaluate existing rules and strengthen 
them by looking to outside examples. This article analyzes the current 
regulations established by the governing bodies of European football and 
details how foreign investors are able to circumvent these regulations. 
Further, this article articulates potential solutions to the current Financial 
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Since the introduction of UEFA’s1 Financial Fair Play (FFP) 
regulations, European football2 has seen remarkable growth in revenue and 
profitability.3 As profitability and popularity continue to grow, so does 
outside interest in European football. For example, in 2015, American 
broadcasting company NBC spent $1 billion to secure broadcasting rights to 
the English Premier League until the 2021/2022 season.4 This broadcasting 
deal represents just one of Europe’s five main leagues. While most European 
countries have their own football league, the five most successful leagues 
come from Spain, England, Italy, Germany, and France.5 
With the increasing popularity of European football, there has been a 
growth of foreign investment into different European clubs.6 Since 2004, 
UEFA football clubs have seen record high investments coming from outside 
Europe.7 There are forty-four clubs in major European leagues that are under 
foreign ownership.8 Through these investment, foreign owners are looking to 
cash in on the modern popularity of UEFA football.9 With the introduction 
of FFP, top clubs welcomed additional foreign investments to continue their 
race to the top.10 
An integral part of becoming one of the most successful clubs in Europe 
involves acquiring top talent. Talent acquisition takes place during periods 
referred to as transfer windows.11 There are two transfer windows each year 
each giving teams opportunities to acquire new talent.12 During a transfer 
window, European clubs spend large amounts of money acquiring new 
                                                          
 1 Union of the European Football Association. 
 2 Since this paper will be discussing soccer in Europe, the article will refer to ‘soccer’ as 
‘football.’ Additionally, ‘soccer teams’ will be referred to as ‘football clubs.’ 
 3 THE UNION OF EUROPEAN FOOTBALL ASS’N, THE EUROPEAN CLUB FOOTBALL 
LANDSCAPE: CLUB LICENSING BENCHMARK REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015)[hereinafter 
UEFA 2015 REPORT]. 
 4 Richard Sandomir, NBC Retains Rights to Premier League in Six-Year Deal, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/sports/soccer/nbc-
retains-rights-to-premier-league-in-six-year-deal.html. 
 5 See UEFA rankings for club competitions, UEFA, 
https://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/uefarankings/country (last visited Oct. 14, 2017). 
 6 Repucom, Emerging Giants 5 (2015). 
 7 See id.; see also UEFA 2015 Report, supra note 3, at 56. 
 8 UEFA 2015 report, supra note 3, at 53. 
 9 Repucom, supra note 6. 
 10 Uefa says financial fair play has changed to attract new investors, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 29, 2015 4:53 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jun/29/uefa-financial-
fair-play-investors. 
 11 FIFA, REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS (2003), 
HTTPS://WWW.FIFA.COM/MM/DOCUMENT/AFFEDERATION/ADMINISTRATION/REGULATIONS_ON_T
HE_STATUS_AND_TRANSFER_OF_PLAYERS_EN_33410.PDF. 
 12 Id. 
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talent.13 During the 2017 Summer transfer window, the English Premier 
League alone spent £1.4 billion, the most it had spent in a single transfer 
window.14 It goes without saying, the more money a club is able to spend on 
players, the more successful it will be. 
A profound example of a club spending big to reach the top is the recent 
success Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) has enjoyed on the pitch15 and in the 
transfer market.16 PSG, as recently as Summer of 2017, spent €222 million, 
a record amount, on one player: Neymar from FC Barcelona.17 PSG spent 
this level of money, through revenues never before seen until their new 
foreign owners, to portray PSG as the top clubs in the world.18 While this 
level of spending helped a club like PSG; some in their pursuit for European 
success have found themselves in deep financial trouble.19 The trouble many 
European clubs found themselves in, due to irresponsible spending, led to the 
creation of FFP.20 
In the three years prior to the creation of FFP, UEFA clubs were, on 
average, operating with net operating losses.21 Evidenced through the record 
breaking losses prior to FFP, frivolous spending in a race to the top became 
the norm for some clubs.22 Since the implementation of FFP, European clubs 
continue to post positive revenues.23 FFP sought to incite discipline and 
rationality in UEFA clubs spending.24 UEFA, through FFP, sought to bring 
                                                          
 13 See generally Premier League Clubs spend £1.4bn to break summer transfer record, 
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2017 6:03 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/sep/01/transfer-window-deadline-day-record-
spend#img-1 (discussing the spending of the top five European leagues. Three out of five of 
the top leagues spent over a billion pounds in the summer of 2017). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Pitch is the term used in Europe for soccer field. This paper will refer to a ‘soccer field’ 
as a ‘pitch.’ 
 16 See Jason Burt, Exclusive: Nasser Al-Khelaifi reveals how Neymar and Mbappe can 
help PSG take on the world, THE TELEGRAPGH (Sept. 11, 2017 4:34 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/football/2017/09/11/exclusive-nasser-al-khelaifi-reveals-
neymar-mbappe-can-help/ (interview with PSG’s Qatari owner discussing how the record 
breaking spending by a club on one player, Neymar, will help the club reach the top and 
challenge for the top spot of all their respective competitions). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Graham Spiers, How the mighty Glasgow Rangers have fallen, THE GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 18, 2015 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jan/18/how-the-
mighty-glasgow-rangers-have-fallen. 
 20 See UEFA CLUB LICENSING AND FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS, EDITION 2015 
art. 2 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 FFP]. 
 21 UEFA 2015 Report, supra note 3, at 107 (UEFA clubs, in aggregate, took losses of 
€249 million, €336 million, and €382 million in 2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively). 
 22 See id.; see also 2015 FFP, supra note 20. 
 23 Id. 
 24 2015 FFP, supra note 20, art. 2(1)(c). 
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club spending in line with their expenses through the break-even analysis.25 
With the increase in foreign investment,26 clubs and their new foreign 
owners have found creative ways to get around FFP.27 Rich foreign 
benefactors found ingenious ways to use their incredible wealth to help their 
newly acquired clubs race to the top through the purchase of new talent.28 
One must ask, have the regulations found in FFP truly been as effective as 
UEFA hoped? It is now apparent that FFP curbed irresponsible spending in 
some regard; but are some clubs losing more than others because of FFP? 
This paper will explore whether FFP allowed foreign investors to pick 
winners and loser through the increase of their investments. 
The paper proceeds by first examining the rise of foreign money in 
European football in Section II. This section will explore the beginnings of 
foreign investments and what the investments look like. Next, in Section III, 
this paper will review FFP regulations and how they are currently managing 
the financial landscape of European football. Section III will look at the 
history and objectives of FFP, how FFP has affected the game so far, and 
how FFP interacts with current European law. In Section IV, this paper will 
explore how foreign investors and owners are able to circumvent the rules of 
FFP, and how clubs are undercutting the spirit of FFP through the use of 
foreign investments. Section V of this paper will identify and posit 
recommendations of how to amend FFP to ensure the objectives FFP sought 
to accomplish come to fruition while continuing the competitive nature of 
European football that has captured the hearts of so many around the world. 
Last, this paper will conclude with the current outlook of FFP and how it will 
continue to affect the game. 
II. THE RISE OF FOREIGN MONEY 
A. The Origin of Foreign Money 
The largest share of foreign owners in Europe come from Asian 
                                                          
 25 2015 FFP, supra note 20, art. 57. 
 26 Repucom, supra note 6, at 3. 
 27 See Jack Pitt-Brooke, Arsene Wenger hits out against FFP as Arsenal manager’s 
patience runs thin, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 7, 2017 10:01 PM), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/premier-league/arsenal-latest-arsene-wenger-
scrap-ffp-patience-runs-thin-a7935291.html (one of the top football club managers in Europe 
discussing how larger clubs use smaller “bridge” clubs to buy players using the smaller club 
revenue stream then transfer the purchased player to the larger club, completely circumventing 
FFP legally). 
 28 See Mark Ogden, Paris Saint-Germain sponsorship deal eclipse all rivals but opens 
questions about Financial Fair Play regulations, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 12, 2013 12:58 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/european/10443730/Paris-Saint-Germain-
sponsorship-deal-eclipses-all-rivals-but-opens-questions-about-Financial-Fair-Play-
regulations.html (discussing PSG foreign owners funneling their wealth into the club through 
a sponsorship deal to increase revenues allowing PSG greater room to spend in the transfer 
market). 
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countries.29 But this is a recent trend.30 The Russian purchase of Chelsea F.C. 
marks the beginning of the influx of foreign owners.31 On July 1, 2003, 
Russian businessman Roman Abramovich purchased Chelsea F.C., clearing 
all debts from the club while making the largest purchase of new players any 
English club had seen up to that point.32 The purchase of Chelsea F.C. is the 
first example of a foreign owner using his own wealth to shape a team to 
compete for top accolades.33 To date, Mr. Abramovich has spent over a £1 
billion on the football club in their pursuit to the top of the football world.34 
The success seen at Chelsea F.C. is what many foreign investors seek to 
replicate. The second largest group of foreign owners in Europe are from 
North America.35 With thirteen out of twenty clubs in the English Premier 
League owned by foreign investors, Americans own six of those clubs.36 The 
most popular example of a European club owned by American owners is 
Manchester United after their purchase by the Glazer family.37 This was one 
of the more controversial purchases of a European football club by foreign 
ownership.38 
The smallest foreign owner group in European football comes from the 
Middle East;39 but while maintaining the smallest ownership share, they have 
made a sizable impact.40 Middle Eastern ownership accounts for four clubs 
throughout Europe which are located in different leagues in Europe.41 From 
                                                          
 29 UEFA 2015 Report, supra note 3, at 55. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id.; see also Chelsea, Club History, https://www.chelseafc.com/the-club/club-
history/2000.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017). 
 32 Chelsea, Club History, https://www.chelseafc.com/the-club/club-history/2000.html 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2017); Jeremy Wilson, How Chelsea Owner Roman Abramovich changed 
the face of football in England, THE TELEGRAPH (June 29, 2016 8:00 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/chelsea/10149386/How-Chelsea-owner-
Roman-Abramovich-changed-the-face-of-football-in-England.html (discussing Mr. 
Abramovich’s £140 million purchase of Chelsea with an additional £100 million spent on new 
players the same year). 
 33 See Jeremy Wilson, supra note 32. 
 34 See id. Chelsea did finally reach the pinnacle of European football in 2012 when they 
won the UEFA Champion’s League crowning them champions of Europe. 
 35 UEFA 2015 Report, supra note 3, at 55. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Martin Domin, Glazer family float more of club in New York, DAILY MIRROR (Aug. 10, 
2017 2:27 PM), http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/football/manchester-united-owners-sell-56m-
10963970. 
 38 See id. (discussing fan disapproval in the America Owner’s taking assets out of the club 
while neglecting infuse money into the club). 
 39 UEFA 2015 Report, supra note 3, 55. 
 40 See Repucom, supra note 6, at 3. 
 41 See UEFA 2015 Report, supra note 3, at 55 (discussing Middle Eastern ownership in 
the English Premier League, the English Championship League, French League 1, and Spain’s 
La Liga). 
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the introduction of Middle Eastern investments in 200742 to 2014, Middle 
Eastern ownership has invested $1.5 billion in club activities.43 The two most 
notable teams under Middle Eastern ownership that experienced meteoric 
rise since the introduction of foreign investments are Manchester City and 
PSG. Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) royal family purchased Manchester City F.C.44 Sheikh Mansour 
purchased ninety percent ownership in Manchester City for £210 million in 
2008;45 he quickly purchased the remaining ten percent a year later. Because 
Manchester City had new Middle Eastern ownership, they were able to 
secure a lucrative ten-year deal with UAE airline Etihad worth around £80 
million a year.46 In 2015, seven years after the purchase of Manchester City, 
many believed the club’s value was around £3 billion.47 
Qatar Sports Investment’s (QSI)48 purchase of Paris Saint-Germaine 
F.C. (hereinafter ‘PSG’), believed to be valued around $130 million, was 
another prominent Middle Eastern acquisition.49 QSI is the sports division of 
the Qatar Investment Authority, Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund.50 During 
QSI’s six-year ownership of PSG, a commenter estimates that PSG have 
spent a total of over €905 million on new players alone.51 
European football has seen vast amount of foreign capital invested into 
different clubs and there are no indications of the investments slowing.52 In 
                                                          
 42 See Repucom, supra note 6, at 7 (discussing a $250 million investment from Iranian 
owners into Arsenal F.C.). 
 43 Id. 
 44 David Conn, Last shares give Sheikh Mansour total control of Manchester City, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2009 7:10 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2009/sep/23/manchester-city-takeover. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Simon Mullock, Manchester City’s new £80-million-per-year sponsorship deal will 
bank them nearly DOUBLE that of rivals United, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 7, 2015, 10:30 PM), 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/football/news/manchester-citys-new-80million-per-year-
sponsorship-5290985 (discussing Manchester City negotiating a new deal from their current 
sponsor Etihad to make them one of the highest paid teams in terms of sponsorship in the 
English Premier League); see also Beatrice Thomas, Arabtec Signs 3yr Man City Sponsorship 
Deal, ARABIAN BUSINESS (May 15, 2014 9:54 AM). 
 47 Jamie Jackson, Manchester City owners announce £265 million deal with Chinese 
investors, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2015, 5:14 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/dec/01/manchester-city-265m-deal-chinese-
investment-group (discussing an investment in Manchester City by a Chinese investor totaling 
£265 million, which as of 2015 accounted for thirteen percent of the club). 
 48 Qataris complete PSG buyout, EUROSPORT (June 3, 2012, 4:32 PM), 
http://www.eurosport.com/football/ligue-1/2011-2012/qatar-completes-psg-
buyout_sto3182939/story.shtml [hereinafter PSG buyout]. 
 49 Repucom, supra note 6, at 7. 
 50 PSG buyout, supra note 48. 
 51 Rob Bairner, Neymar to PSG: how much have Qatar owners spent on transfers since 
2011 takeover?, GOAL (Aug. 4, 2017, 6:51 AM), http://www.goal.com/en/news/neymar-to-
psg-how-much-have-qatar-owners-spent-on-transfers/1kpoa9c2p4mpw1vjorclin0tm9. 
 52 See generally UEFA 2015 report, supra note 3, at 53 (discussing 2016 was the most 
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2016, European football saw the highest activity of foreign takeovers which 
included ten new takeovers, eight of which were Chinese owners.53 In 2016 
alone, Chinese investors became principal owners in three English clubs: 
Aston Villa, Wolverhampton Wanderers, and West Bromwich Albion.54 
B. The Structure of Foreign Investments 
Mirroring the rise in European football popularity, the methods foreign 
investors use to invest in the sport are expanding.55 Foreign investment goes 
beyond just purchasing a club. Investments into this lucrative pastime also 
include club sponsorships,56 player sponsorships,57 and different media 
rights.58 While there do remain many ways for foreign investors to maintain 
a stake in the sport, club ownership remains the most lucrative and appealing. 
When it comes to club structures, some operate as publicly traded 
companies while other remain closely held private companies.59 Depending 
on the structure of the club, the methods a foreign investor will go about 
purchasing the club will differ. Take for example the publicly traded club 
Manchester United and their buyout by foreign investors from the United 
States. The American Glazer family famously, or perhaps infamously, 
acquired 98% of the stock of English football club Manchester United.60 The 
buyout began in March of 2003 when the Glazer family purchased 2.9% of 
Manchester United’s publicly traded shares for approximately £9 million.61 
                                                          
active for foreign acquisition to date). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Sam Wallace, Great haul of China is changing European football and up to 30 more 
billionaires are looking to invest in clubs, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 7, 2016, 6:02 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/football/2016/09/07/great-haul-of-china-is-changing-european-
football-and-up-to-30-m/. 
 55 Repucom, supra note 6, at 5-6. 
 56 Id. (discussing the top twenty clubs in Europe now feature some type of sponsorship 
from a middle eastern company). 
 57 See R.J.E., Why Neymar is different, THE ECONOMIST (AUG. 9, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2017/08/football-transfers (discussing Qatar, 
after signing Neymar to PSG, are looking into making Neymar the ambassador of the 2022 
Qatar world cup). 
 58 Repucom, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing Qatar’s media company Al Jazeera, through 
the subsidiary BeIN, purchasing the media rights to all English Premier League games in the 
Middle East market, additionally, BeIN holding all rights to UEFA Champion League games 
in Southern Asia). 
 59 See generally Vikram Barhat, Love sports? Buy your own team–or part of one, BBC 
(June 11, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/capital/story/20140610-love-sports-buy-a-team 
(discussing how some clubs, like Manchester United, are traded publicly and club ownership 
is open to anyone who can buy one or more share but also looking at how the purchase of 
privately held clubs are purchased in a “word of mouth” sort of market). 
 60 See Glazer gets 98% of Man Utd shares, BBC (June 28, 2005, 10:29 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4629401.stm. 
 61 Super Bowl hero takes slice of Man Utd, BBC (Mar. 2, 2003, 6:37 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2813439.stm. 
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By October of 2004, the Glazer family owned nearly 30% of Manchester 
United public shares and then began officially putting together a bid to 
acquire the club in totality.62 In April 2005, the Glazers readied an £800 
million bid to buyout Manchester United entirely.63 
The purchase structure of a privately held club will differ from that of a 
publicly traded club.64 After two years of negotiation, culminating in 2017, 
Italian owners sold AC Milan, one of the most prolific teams in Italian 
football, to foreign investors.65 The purchase of AC Milan from the former 
Italian owner cost the new Chinese owners an estimated €740 million.66 The 
new owners used a Luxembourg-based company by the name of Rossoneri 
Sport Investment Lux to buy AC Milan.67 Yonghong Li controls the new 
Luxembourg company, but the overall ownership structure of this newly 
created company has yet to be revealed.68 
Yonhhon Li’s and Han Li’s takeover of AC Milan is an example that 
foreign investments can be based on considerations other than mere club 
acquisitions. Representatives of the Chinese investors revealed the day after 
the club acquisition they had begun looking into purchasing a new stadium.69 
The new owners, currently renting AC Milan’s home stadium, are looking 
into acquiring a new stadium in an effort to have larger control over ticket 
prices and other match-day revenue.70 In addition to the investment made by 
the new investors in purchasing the club and looking to buy a new stadium, 
the new ownership team spent heavily in the transfer market in an effort to 
drive up revenue.71 AC Milan, with the help of their new Chinese owners, 
spent an estimated €151 million on new player before the start of the first 
                                                          
 62 See Glazer gets 98% of Man Utd shares, supra note 60. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See generally Ben Gladwell, Silvio Berlusconi sells AC Milan to Chinese investors, 
ESPN (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.espnfc.com/ac-milan/story/3102696/silvio-berlusconi-
sells-ac-milan-to-chinese-investors (discussing the one-on-one negotiation between the seller 
and buyer rather than the buyer acquiring shares through the open market as seen with the 
Manchester United acquisition). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. (the €740 million purchase includes €220 million in liabilities currently held by the 
club as well as €90 million in operating expenses that had been paid by the previous owner 
which is set to be refunded). 
 67 Giulia Segreti & Elvira Pollina, New Chinese owners of Italy’s AC Milan soccer club 
to invest in stadium: CEO, REUTERS (Apr. 14, 2017, 5:12 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-acmilan-m-a-ceo/new-chinese-owners-of-italys-ac-milan-
soccer-club-to-invest-in-stadium-ceo-idUSKBN17G0SF. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. (discussing the Italian club looking to either build a new stadium or buy the stadium 
they currently rent). 
 70 Id. 
 71 James Walker-Roberts, Will AC Milan challenge in Serie A again after ‘summer of 
dreams’?, SKY SPORTS (Aug. 01, 2017 1:50 PM), 
http://www.skysports.com/football/news/11863/10959576/are-ac-milan-primed-to-
challenge-in-serie-a-again-after-summer-of-dreams. 
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season under the new owners.72 
III. UEFA’S FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY RULES AND REGULATIONS 
A. Origin of Financial Fair Play and the Objectives Behind It 
UEFA signed and approved the FFP regulations in 2010 and they took 
effect at the beginning of the 2011/2012 season of European football.73 
Article two of the FFP regulations make it clear that the objective of enacting 
FFP rules was to increase the integrity and longevity of the game.74 UEFA 
holds FFP was not meant to bring parity between small and large clubs, and 
whether FFP made it harder for smaller clubs to compete was not an issue 
they sought to address.75 FFP hurting smaller clubs chances against bigger 
clubs is not synonymous to making all clubs equal in size. As stated by 
several chairmen of larger football clubs, FFP has really hurt the 
competitiveness of smaller clubs.76 Bruce Buck of Chelsea F.C., stated “[t]he 
problem with FFP in essence is it goes a long way to preserving the status 
quo.”77 Mr. Buck also added “[o]ne of the great things about football in this 
country, and many others, is if you are last in [a lower league] you can still 
hope one day you will be in the Premier League. That is difficult, if not 
impossible, with FFP.”78 
FFP states its objective is to improve the standard of all aspects of 
European football; the aspect of competition it would appear has been left by 
the wayside with these new regulations.79 The Chairman of Chelsea F.C. even 
                                                          
 72 See id. 
 73 Financial fair play: all you need to know, UEFA.COM, 
http://www.uefa.com/community/news/newsid=2064391.html(last updated Oct. 23, 2017) 
[hereinafter FFP all you need to know]. 
 74 2015 FFP, supra note 20, art. 2. Article 2 of FFP states the objectives are to: a) further 
promote and improve the standard of all aspects of European football competitions; b) to 
ensure adequate management of football clubs; c) to ensure the infrastructure of football clubs 
are safe for all constituents; d) to ensure smooth running UEFA club competitions; and e) to 
develop financial benchmarks for clubs regarding their financial strength. Additionally, article 
2 of UEFA’s FFP set out the objectives, specifically aimed at UEFA competitions, that set out 
to: a) increase the transparency and credibility of club’s financials; b) increase protection of 
club creditors; c) increase discipline and rationality in club spending; d) encourage clubs to 
spend within their means; e) encourage responsible spending to increase longevity of football 
clubs; f) to protect the longevity of European football. 
 75 FFP all you need to know, supra note 73. 
 76 Glenn Moore, Financial Fair Play policy unfair on smaller clubs claim chairmen of 
Chelsea and Southampton, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 10, 2013 2:54 PM), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/financial-fair-play-policy-
unfair-on-smaller-clubs-claim-chairmen-of-chelsea-and-southampton-8872161.html. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id.(discussing Southampton’s difficulty in closing the financial gap between them 
and larger clubs making it harder to compete. The chairman of Southampton discussed the 
fact they may need to start focusing on developing youth players that could be sold to larger 
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hinted that foreign investments may be partly responsible for the disparity 
between the competitiveness of smaller clubs and larger clubs.80 Mr. Buck 
alluded to the fact that third-party sponsorship deals may potentially be useful 
to boost the revenue of clubs, allowing them to spend big while staying 
within FFP.81 Third-party sponsorship deals are exactly one type of financial 
investment used by foreign owners to pick winners and losers in European 
football.82 
UEFA released FFP in 2011 but those rules are no longer in effect today; 
UEFA updated FFP in 2015.83 Using the input of many constituents of the 
FFP regulation, UEFA spent nearly two years developing the updated 
regulations.84 UEFA intended FFP’s new changes to take into account clubs 
who have recently gone through an “economic shock” and give them some 
leeway.85 Additionally, the new 2015 FFP regulations will exclude 
expenditures for youth and women’s football programs.86 The President of 
UEFA stated that even though the FFP regulations have been updated, “the 
overall objectives of [FFP] remain the same.”87 The previous General 
Secretary of UEFA, Gianni Infantino, explained he hopes that the new FFP 
revisions will serve to entice new investors in European football.88 
B. The Current Iteration of Financial Fair Play 
UEFA entrusts the enforcement of their FFP rules to the Club Financial 
Control Body (CFCB).89 The CFCB has two chambers, both of which answer 
to the CFCB chairman.90 First, the investigatory chamber has the task of 
                                                          
clubs to remain commercially viable since they will not be able to compete on the pitch). 
 80 See id. 
 81 See id. 
 82 See Mullock, supra note 46 (discussing third-party sponsorship of Manchester City 
allowing them to spend large amount of money in the transfer window acquiring better 
players). 
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(2015). 
 90 Id. art. 4. 
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monitoring clubs and investigating potential wrong-doings91 Second, the 
adjudicatory chamber oversees the judgment stage of any proceedings.92 The 
CFCB chief investigator heads the investigatory chamber and the CFCB 
chairman heads the adjudicatory chamber.93 There cannot be a member in 
either chamber that also serves in the other chamber.94 
Should the CFCB find that a club violated the FFP, they have many 
options available to them in disciplining the club.95 The potential disciplinary 
measures available to the CFCB range from a warning to the withdrawal of 
a club’s previously won trophy.96 While there is a wide range of potential 
punishments, the CFCB prefers settlements with clubs rather than harsher 
punitive punishments.97 Settlement agreements offered by the CFCB may set 
out objectives, with timelines, clubs must meet.98 If a club is able to complete 
stated objectives in its settlement agreement ahead of schedule, the CFCB 
can amend the remaining objectives within the settlement agreement if the 
offending club makes a reasoned request.99 
The first iteration of the FFP mainly sought to ensure clubs did not have 
any overdue payables.100 UEFA introduced the break-even analysis which 
looks to balance club spending with their revenue and looks to curb clubs 
accumulating debt.101 The break-even analysis is set out in article fifty-eight 
through sixty-four of UEFA’s FFP regulations.102 Any club that wishes to 
participate in UEFA-sanctioned competitions must comply with the FFP 
break-even analysis.103 
Article fifty-eight of FFP outlines streams of revenue and club expenses 
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that are to be evaluated under the break-even analysis.104 FFP, in article fifty-
eight, also outlines that income and expenses from “related parties” must be 
adjusted to reflect fair market value.105 FFP defines “related parties” to 
include individually related parties and legal entities.106 Due to the demand 
of European football, clubs can feel enticed to inflate the value of revenue 
received from a related party;107 thus, the need for UEFA’s stipulation that 
revenue from a related party needs to reflect a fair market value. What some 
clubs attempt to do through related party revenue is conceal equity 
contributions to the club as legitimate payment for services.108 The difficulty 
for UEFA is determining what percentage of a related party payment, if any, 
is an equity contribution rather than payment for services rendered.109 
There are three reporting periods outlined in Article fifty-nine of FFP 
which a club will be assessed under.110 The first reporting period under the 
break-even analysis, known as reporting period T, is the ending of the 
calendar year that the UEFA competition begins.111 The second reporting 
period, referred to as T-1, is the year prior to T.112 The last reporting period, 
referred to as T-2, is the year prior to T-1.113 For example, if UEFA is 
evaluating the break-even analysis for a club during the 2017/2018 season, 
the analysis would cover the reporting periods ending in 2017 (T), 2016 (T-
1), and 2015 (T-2).114 
Article sixty of FFP, referred to as the “notion of break-even results,” 
discusses what exactly the break-even analysis evaluates.115 The break-even 
analysis looks at the revenues earned by the club and expenses paid by the 
club to determine if the club is operating in a deficit or surplus.116 The CFCB 
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will inquire into whether a club has a surplus or deficit for each reporting 
period (T, T-1, and T-2).117 If all three reporting periods total zero or more, 
UEFA will judge the club to have a break-even surplus.118 However, if the 
amount between all three reporting periods is less than zero, UEFA will find 
the club will to have a break-even deficit.119 Moreover, if a club does have a 
break-even deficit over the three reporting periods, they can point to a surplus 
in two previous reporting periods (T-3 and T-4) in an attempt to reduce their 
deficit.120 
While UEFA looks to ensure clubs are not spending beyond their 
means, they do allow slight deviation for clubs when it comes to the break-
even analysis.121 Article sixty-one provides allowable deviations. UEFA 
allows clubs to deviate from the break-even analysis by amounts up to €5 
million.122 However, if the club has an equity owner or a related party making 
contributions to the club, the club is allowed a deviation of €30 million.123 
Allowing a deviation of €30 million if capital contributions are present from 
equity owners or related parties is a reduction from the €45 million that the 
2012 version of FFP regulations allowed.124 
The rest of the articles in the FFP regulations that make up the break-
even analysis (sixty-two through sixty-four) detail what information the club 
must provide and when.125 FFP details clubs whom operate a deficit in either 
T, T-1, or T-2 must submit projected financials for the upcoming fiscal year 
indicating their financials are moving in the right direction.126 
C. Application of the Break-Even Analysis 
UEFA has issued fifty-four settlements or adjudications since the 
introduction of the break-even analysis for club with varying degrees of FFP 
breaches.127 A little over half of the disciplinary action taken by the CFCB 
for breach of FFP have been the CFCB settling with clubs over their FFP 
breach.128 Out of the fifty-four disciplinary actions taken by the CFCB, some 
of them have garnered more media attention than others. These cases 
illuminate the application of FFP best due to the visibility of not only the 
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infractions of the club, but the results of the penalties faced by the clubs. 
One of the most recent decisions by the CFCB against a club was the 
settlement agreement reached between the CFCB and the storied Portuguese 
club FC Porto.129 UEFA found FC Porto in breach of the monitoring 
requirements found in articles fifty-three through sixty-eight, particularly the 
break-even analysis found in articles fifty-eight to sixty-four.130 The two 
years prior to CFCB disciplinary action, FC Porto had net operating losses of 
€48,614,000 and €16,745,000 respectively.131 FC Porto had taken steps to 
bring the club within the requirements of the break-even analysis; 
consequently FC Porto was able to present a comprehensive business plan to 
the CFCB investigators.132 Because FC Porto presented their plan, the CFCB, 
per article fifteen of the procedure rules governing the CFCB, found a 
settlement agreement an acceptable outcome in this case.133 
The settlement agreement requires FC Porto to satisfy the break-even 
analysis by monitoring periods for 2018, 2019, and 2020.134 Additionally, FC 
Porto agrees to forfeit €700,000 of their winnings for their participation in 
the 2016/2017 UEFA Champions League competition.135 If FC Porto fails to 
adhere to the break-even analysis for 2018, 2019, or 2020 outlined in the 
settlement agreement, they will forfeit an additional €1,500,000 from their 
2016/2017 UEFA champions league winnings.136 In addition to FC Porto’s 
monetary punishment, they were also subject to a sporting punishment as 
well.137 FC Porto had the maximum number of registrable players they can 
register for UEFA Champions League competition reduced for each year of 
the settlement monitoring period.138 
During 2014, the first year CFCB discipline took place after the 
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introduction of the FFP, two high-profile settlements occurred: one with 
Manchester City and the other with PSG.139 Both settlements occurred on the 
same day, May 16, 2014. Manchester City, for fiscal year 2011 and 2012,140 
had net operating losses of £189,587,000 and £93,444,000 respectively;141 
and in 2013, or reporting period T, Manchester City took a loss of 
£44,753,000.142 PSG also took losses over the course of the reporting periods 
applicable to their settlement.143 PSG’s losses stemmed mainly from UEFA 
reevaluating a sponsorship agreement between PSG and Qatar Tourism 
Authority (QTA).144 The CFCB found PSG had been above the allocated 
deviation from the break-even analysis once the PSG/QTA sponsorship deal 
was reevaluated.145 
Additionally, both PSG and Manchester City faced similar penalties 
under FFP in their settlement agreements with CFCB.146 Manchester City 
agreed to pay UEFA a total of €60 million in fees, of which €40 million 
would be returned to Manchester City if they fully comply with the 
settlement agreement.147 The CFCB handed PSG the same monetary 
penalty.148 Both clubs were prohibited from increasing their spending on 
player salaries while also significantly reducing their spending on new 
players for the next two years.149 Lastly, the CFCB required both clubs to 
reduce their registered players for all UEFA competitions down to twenty-
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one players from the standard twenty-five players.150 
FFP, while only being around for a few years, has already made a large 
impact on the game. Revenue has increased and deficit spending has 
decreased, ensuring clubs are spending responsibly.151 UEFA enacted FFP to 
ensure fiscal responsibility in European clubs,152 however, some clubs have 
found ways of getting around FFP in hopes of achieving victory on the largest 
European stage. 
IV. METHODS USED BY FOREIGN OWNERS TO AVOID 
FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS. 
The rationale behind FFP is to ensure clubs do not spend beyond their 
means,153 but some clubs discovered ways to undercut the spirit of FFP while 
technically remaining within the regulatory guidelines.154 UEFA requires, 
per FFP article fifty-eight, relevant income and expenses from related parties 
to be assessed at fair market value.155 The issue with related party income, 
specifically when it comes from sponsorships, is it can be difficult to discern 
what part, if any, of the revenue is truly intended to be a sponsorship payment 
and what portion is equity contributions to the football club from the related 
party.156 
The realization that some clubs may attempt to obscure equity 
contributions through related party “revenues” is not lost on UEFA.157 On at 
least two occasions, UEFA called into questions revenue received from 
related parties. One of those occasions occurred in connection to a 
sponsorship deal the English club Manchester City entered into with the 
airline Etihad.158 Both Etihad’s and Manchester City’s owners hail from the 
UAE.159 The owner of Manchester City is a member of the royal family of 
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UAE while the owner of Etihad airlines is the UAE government.160 
Manchester City and Etihad claimed they valued their sponsorship deal to be 
worth around £400 million over ten years.161 In the two years prior to the 
announcement of this sponsorship agreement, Manchester City posted 
revenue of -£93 million and -£121 million respectively.162 UEFA made the 
decision to investigate the sponsorship deal to ensure Manchester City was 
not using the sponsorship deal to circumvent the new FFP rules recently put 
in place; mainly because Manchester City was facing such large losses in the 
years prior.163 
In addition to UEFA voicing concern about clubs potentially 
sidestepping FFP through the use of related parties, the Council of Europe 
(COE) proffered the same concern.164 The COE raised concerns over the 
Etihad sponsorship of Manchester city as a way for the club to circumvent 
FFP rules.165 Additionally, the COE discussed the idea UEFA should prohibit 
clubs from “sponsoring themselves or using associated bodies to do so.”166 
Lastly, the COE raised concerns of sponsors inflating the value of their 
sponsorship deal in order to increase revenues of European clubs.167 The 
COE went on to deem the sponsorship deal between Etihad and Manchester 
City as “improper.”168 However, the COE acts as a watchdog and is separate 
from the European Union; they have no power to impose any kind of rules.169 
While UEFA eventually sanctioned Manchester City for failing the break-
even analysis,170 UEFA found the sponsorship deal with Etihad to not be a 
related party transaction, therefore, the value did not necessitate scrutiny.171 
The second deal that caught the attention of UEFA due to a related party 
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transaction was PSG’s sponsorship with QTA.172 PSG’s sponsorship deal 
with QTA would see €200 million generated annually in sponsorship 
revenue, eclipsing any sponsorship revenue earned by their rivals.173 Unlike 
the Manchester City sponsorship deal, the CFCB found the sponsorship to 
have been a related party transaction.174 Because the CFCB found this 
agreement to be a related party transaction, the value assessed by PSG needed 
to reflect the fair value. The CFCB found the value of €200 million annually 
for the sponsorship was not the “fair value” and thus UEFA needed to 
reevaluate the value.175 In reevaluating the value of the sponsorship, the 
CFCB found PSG’s revenue did not meet or exceed their expenses and 
therefore was in violation of the break-even analysis.176 
While the CFCB found both PSG and Manchester City liable for 
breaching FFP, specifically the break-even analysis, their punishment mainly 
came in the form of monetary damages and heightened supervision.177 What 
is not evident in the FFP regulations is whether repeat offenders will face 
harsher penalties or if they will continue being admonished in the form of 
monetary fines.178 If there is no process to levy harsher punishments against 
repeat offenders under FFP, we may see clubs with wealthy foreign 
benefactors pricing UEFA’s monetary fines into the cost of doing business. 
In the current corporate regulatory environment, it has become commonplace 
for companies to price in their violations (also known as an “efficient 
breach”).179 The spirit of FFP as well as the stated objectives would be 
undercut if clubs are allowed to “efficiently breach” FFP via their owners 
paying the fines. If FFP is to not only survive but achieve its stated objectives, 
UEFA must make changes in how the regulations are applied to clubs across 
Europe. 
V. SOLUTIONS TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF FINANCIAL FAIR 
PLAY REGULATIONS 
With what appears to be some clubs choosing to eschew UEFA’s FFP 
regulations, there needs to be reform to ensure FFP lives on and accomplishes 
its stated objectives. By closing some current holes in the regulations, club 
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spending can maintain the rationalism intended by FFP while ensuring 
foreign owners are not able to pick winners and losers. 
The first issue to address is whether repeat offenders will face harsher 
sanctions than monetary fines. Using the law-as-price theory posited by 
Professor Williams,180 it would make little sense for clubs to stop breaking 
the rules if they are to only face continual monetary fines. Allowing clubs to 
price in habitual breaching of the FFP regulations would not only be costly 
to the competition in football, it would be costly to the regulatory system put 
in place by UEFA. 
Let us use the FC Porto sanctions discussed above as an example.181 For 
the 2016/2017 season, the CFCB fined FC Porto €2,200,000 for their breach 
of FFP regulations. The season prior to this sanction being imposed, FC 
Porto’s operational income was roughly €75,000,000.182 The fine imposed by 
the CFCB in the settlement comes out to be almost three percent of their 
operational income from the previous year. Although the CFCB have other 
punishments at their disposal beyond monetary fines, the CFCB adjudication 
rules for administering FFP do not require the CFCB to escalate club 
punishment for repeat offenders. If, hypothetically, FC Porto wanted to 
continue to breach FFP in hopes of securing better players, the sanction 
amount is and would continue to be inconsequential to the overall operation 
of the club. The CFCB’s fine could easily be offset by additional income 
stemming from FC Porto’s continual breach of FFP. 
The competitiveness found in the current environment of European 
football has placed a higher intrinsic value on on-the-pitch success than 
bottom line profitably. This is evident through the myriad of clubs failing to 
spend within the boundaries of their income that are reviewed by the CFCB 
on a yearly basis. While the number of clubs spending irresponsibly has 
reduced in recent years due to FFP, there are still cases every year of clubs 
spending outside their means. By allowing clubs to continue to chase top 
talent in hopes of greater success on the pitch while eschewing their financial 
responsibilities, the goals set out by FFP will never come to fruition. There 
is a clear correlation between the amount spent on players and success on the 
pitch, as well as a clear correlation between success on the pitch and 
increased revenue.183 
I proffer, as the first reform to FFP, a new policy be implemented to 
ensure repeat offenders are mandatorily given harsher penalties for every 
subsequent breach of FFP. UEFA would simply need to update article 
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twenty-nine of Procedural Rules governing the UEFA Club Financial 
Control Body regulations or add a subsequent article to indicate harsher 
penalties for repeat offenders. To discourage pricing FFP breaches into the 
club’s business model, punishment for repeat offenses should not include 
monetary fines. The rules governing the CFCB list nine potential disciplinary 
measures; the first three disciplinary measures are a warning, reprimand, and 
a monetary fine respectively.184 Implementing new regulations that require 
repeat offenders to face a minimum punishment starting at the fourth 
disciplinary measure, point reduction,185 would not allow clubs to “price in” 
in their habitual rule breaking and ensure that actual long lasting change is 
introduced to European football by FFP. 
When a club is repeatedly unable to manage their finances, additional 
financial burdens will not serve as a method to correct their behavior. There 
are two potential reasons for a club to breach FFP and spend outside of the 
club’s current revenue level. First, the club is facing legitimate financial 
burdens and are choosing to spend outside their means in hopes of increasing 
revenue through on-the-pitch success. Second, the club has a wealthy owner, 
potentially a foreign owner looking to make a previously unsuccessful club 
successful, and the bottom line finances of that club mean less to the wealthy 
owner than on-the-pitch success. In either of these scenarios, continual fines 
for failing to spend within reason is not a punishment that will lead to a more 
financially stable club. By diminishing a club’s potential success in the 
UEFA competitions through either point reduction or total disbarment from 
the competition, clubs will not have to make a choice between financial 
stability or on-the-pitch success. The CFCB will make this choice for them 
through a policy that eliminates even the chance of on-the-pitch success if 
finances are not stable. 
In addition to requiring the CFCB to start at harsher penalty than 
monetary fines for habitual FFP breaches, I posit an amendment to 
punishment 1(g), found in article twenty-nine of the Procedural Rules 
Governing the CFCB, which could help curb irresponsible spending by 
wealthy foreign owners in hope of securing top talent. Punishment 1(g) states 
the CFCB, in finding a club has breached FFP, may impose a “restriction on 
the number of players that a club may register for participation in UEFA 
competitions, including a financial limit on the overall aggregate cost of the 
employee benefit expenses of players registered on the A-list for the purpose 
of UEFA club competitions.”186 I recommend adding additional language to 
this punishment which would bar clubs from registering any player 
purchased in any fiscal year found to be in violation of FFP regulations. 
Take for example PSG’s most recent settlement which was discussed 
                                                          
 184 Union of European Football Associations, PROC. RULES GOVERNING THE UEFA CLUB 
FIN. CONTROL BODY art. 29(1) (2015). 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. art. 29(1)(g). 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 39:59 (2018) 
80 
previously.187 In this settlement, PSG had their available squad for all UEFA 
competitions reduced to twenty-one from the standard twenty-five. This 
means while PSG may only register twenty-one players, they can register any 
twenty-one players on their roster. If PSG is spending outside their means to 
acquire top talent, these new players could become part of this twenty-one 
players and PSG would choose lesser skilled players to remain unregistered 
in UEFA competitions. During the fiscal period that led to PSG being 
sanctioned, they purchased three star players for a total €114 million: 
Edinson Cavani for €64 million alone,188 and Marquinhos and Lucas Digne 
for the remaining €50 million. 189 Had the recommendation posited here been 
part of the punishment handed out to PSG in 2014, PSG could not register 
these three for the following season. 
By restricting clubs from using players that were purchased with funds 
that led to a breach of FFP, their investments lost most, if not all, their return. 
For example, let us examine PSG again but this time, in the most current 
transfer window. In the summer of 2017, PSG purchased Neymar from 
Barcelona and Mbappe from AC Monaco for a total €367 million.190 While 
the CFCB have not sanctioned PSG for breach of FFP to date, the CFCB is 
investigating PSG’s recent spending.191 If the CFCB finds that PSG breached 
FFP, more likely than not, PSG will face similar sanctions as they did in 2014 
and have their squad reduced from twenty-five to twenty-one. However, if 
those twenty-one spots allotted to PSG for UEFA competitions cannot 
include either Neymar or Mbappe, PSG’s investment of €367 million will 
have little to no return. This change to punishment 1(g) will discourage 
wealthy foreign owners from spending large amounts of money on new 
players knowing they may not be able to use these new expensive players in 
future competitions. By further restricting the players from UEFA 
competitions and installing harsher penalties for habitual rule breakers, new 
foreign owners may feel less inclined to use their wealth to pick winners and 
losers in European football. 
Beyond additional regulations to FFP, the term “related party” of the 
current regulations need to have a more clear and inclusive definition. In 
addition to a better definition to the term, UEFA and the CFCB need to take 
a stance that the term will apply in a broader, more liberal way. If the CFCB 
                                                          
 187 Supra Section III.C. 
 188 Edinson Cavani joins Paris Saint-Germain for French Club Record Fee, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jul. 16, 2013, 3:46 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2013/jul/16/edinson-cavani-paris-saint-germain-
transfer. 
 189 See Tom Williams, Will PSG retain their Ligue 1 title after turbulent summer?, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2013 6:27 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/football-further-
blog/2013/aug/09/paris-saint-germain-retain-ligue-summer. 
 190 Burt, supra note 16. 
 191 Paris-St Germain investigated by UEFA over financial fair play, BBC (Sep. 1, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/41129494. 
Foreign Investments in UEFA 
39:59 (2018) 
81 
adopt a clearer definition of related party, while also interpreting the term in 
a broader sense, the CFCB could ensure the spirit of FFP is upheld to the 
highest extent possible. 
For example, the Etihad sponsorship of Manchester City should fall 
under the definition of related party. Yet, the CFCB found these two parties 
to have not been related parties. This has allowed Manchester City to receive 
large sums of money via sponsorship deals between their club and Etihad 
airlines with minimal oversight by UEFA and CFCB. Under FFP, the CFCB 
consider two parties to be related if they “are controlled, jointly controlled, 
or significantly influenced by the same government.”192 Taking a closer look 
at Manchester City and Etihad, it would appear the CFCB means to interpret 
the language “significant influence by the same government” extremely 
narrowly. One way to combat potential related party transactions from 
escaping UEFA scrutiny would be to broaden the interpretation of the related 
party regulations found in FFP. 
The first solution to the current definition of related parties under FFP 
would be to expand the verbiage found in the actual regulations. Under FFP, 
one qualifies as a related person if they are a close family member such as a 
spouse, child, child of the spouse, or dependent of a key figure of the football 
club that has control or significant influence over the football club.193 This 
definition of a related person is wanting and leaves many different close 
family relationships outside the purview of FFP. The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission(SEC) defines related parties more broadly. The SEC 
defines a related person as “Any immediate family member […] which 
means any child, stepchild, parent, stepparent, spouse, sibling, mother-in-
law, father-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-
law, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household 
of such security holder.”194 
The difference between UEFA’s related person definition and the SEC’s 
is stark. By aligning the definition of related person closer to what has been 
codified by the SEC, UEFA may be able to pull additional transactions under 
their jurisdiction and allow for greater oversight of European Football. This 
greater oversight would help curb transactions disguised as legitimate 
revenue when in actuality they entail equity contributions. 
Next, beyond rewriting the actual definition of related parties, UEFA 
must take the stance of interpreting FFP regulations in a broader sense. An 
example for the need to broaden the interpretation of the regulations is the 
previously given transaction between Manchester City and Etihad Airlines. 
With one being a member of the royal family of UAE and the other being 
owned by the country of UAE, it is confounding how these two parties are 
not “significantly influenced by the same government.” This solution does 
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not require any rewriting of the current FFP regulation. It merely requires the 
CFCB to enforce the regulations that are currently on the books. 
Even if Manchester City and Etihad could make a compelling argument 
that they are not significantly influenced by the same government, it would 
appear a member of the royal family of UAE has “significant influence” over 
an airline owned by UAE.195 UEFA must set out a clear definition of 
“significant influence” and must make that clear definition as broad as 
possible. This again would allow additional transactions to fall under the 
jurisdiction of UEFA and allow for greater oversight of potentially related 
party transactions. 
Moreover, related party transactions need to be differentiated between 
types of transactions. Looking at related party transaction regulations under 
the SEC, different transactions have different regulations pertaining to 
related parties.196 Beyond mirroring the language found in the SEC 
regulations regarding definitions of related parties, UEFA should also 
appropriate the idea of related party regulations regarding specific types of 
transactions. Sponsorships are one of the many ways related parties or 
potentially related parties are able to funnel money into a football club of 
their choosing. A solution to this problem would be to have regulations 
regarding club sponsorships and related parties. 
As the COE raised, there is a concern over clubs “sponsoring 
themselves” through related party sponsorships.197 According to the current 
rules of FFP, if a club is to claim revenue from a related party transactions, 
including a sponsorship deal, it is the club’s responsibility to determine the 
fair market value of the sponsorship deal.198 If UEFA decides to investigate 
the claimed fair market value, the CFCB will refer the transaction for 
investigation to an independent third party to determine the true fair market 
value.199 My recommendation would be to bifurcate related party transactions 
that are based on sponsorship transactions and those that are non-sponsorship 
transactions. The reason for this bifurcation in the regulations would be to 
ensure no European clubs may participate in self-sponsorship.200 My 
recommendation is for UEFA to determine the fair market value of related 
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party sponsorship transactions from the beginning of the transaction rather 
than allow the club to make the initial valuation. 
Requiring UEFA to value sponsorship transactions will deter clubs from 
using related party transactions for a few reasons. First, the club will feel less 
in control of its sponsorship transactions when it comes to related parties 
relative to a third-party sponsorship transaction. A club will feel their 
negotiating position has been reduced when ultimately the value will be 
determined by UEFA. Second, the related party sponsor will be hesitant to 
participate in a related party sponsorship again due to a lack of negotiating 
power. A related party sponsor may feel as if they are being forced to pay too 
much for the exposure being generated from the sponsorship. A related party 
sponsor may feel it could generate a larger exposure for the same price in an 
arms-length transaction with a price negotiated by the parties than it could in 
a related party transaction where the value is set by UEFA. 
Last, requiring UEFA to evaluate the price of a sponsorship transaction 
between a club and a related party would add unnecessary time to a 
sponsorship transaction. Clubs enter into new sponsorships deals for higher 
streams of revenue. If the club requires larger streams of income, it would 
prefer the stream of income to start sooner rather than later. By being able to 
enter an arms-length negotiated sponsorship sooner than a related party 
sponsorship, the club would have another reason to favor non-related party 
sponsorships. 
As stated previously, the CFCB should treat related party sponsorships 
differently than other related party transactions entered into by a club. Other 
non-sponsorship related party transactions will continue to be valued by the 
club and only investigated if UEFA feels there is a deviation between the true 
market value and the value claimed by the club. There are two reason for 
bifurcating these two types of related party transactions. 
First, as it stands now, self-sponsorship through related parties is one of 
the major ways wealthy foreign owners are able to contribute equity to the 
club disguising it as legitimate revenue.201 Until other transactions prove to 
be just as troublesome, the heightened scrutiny is only warranted with 
sponsorship transactions. Second, UEFA would be required to expend large 
amounts of time and resources administering this regulation. To require this 
level of heightened scrutiny on all possible related party transactions would 
become unreasonable and burdensome. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the protection of European football, the FFP regulations needs 
amending to ensure winners and losers are no longer chosen by foreign 
investments. With the increasing popularity of European football, investment 
opportunities have not only increased in number, but increased in value. 
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Since the 2003/2004 season, Europe has seen an explosion of foreign owners 
investing in football clubs. With the increase of additional competition in 
European football, clubs have taken it upon themselves to spend at 
unsustainable levels in a race to the top. Because of this irresponsible 
spending, UEFA decided to introduce the FFP regulations. 
UEFA implemented FFP to ensure responsible spending by the clubs as 
well as to promote and improve all aspects of the game. However, some 
aspects of the game, namely competition, continue to go unimproved. By 
closing certain loopholes exploited by the new foreign owners coming into 
European football, clubs can enjoy financial stability FFP looks to implement 
as well as a competitive sport for the clubs and fans alike. If UEFA addresses 
repeat offenders, the method of valuing related party transactions, and more 
clearly defines a related party, the sport of European football would be better 
off. 
 
